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Introduction
In an interesting recent paper, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Francesco Parisi (2005) reconsidered Gordon Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking game. 1 They introduce an exit option and propose a mixed strategy equilibrium for the case of increasing returns in the contest success function (r > 2): Each player mixes between two strategies: nonparticipation, and participation with one uniquely de…ned positive level of investment in rent-seeking activities. This note shows that these strategies do not constitute an equilibrium of the game speci…ed by Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) . However, these strategies do constitute an equilibrium if the strategy space is restricted by a minimum expenditure requirement, and this minimum expenditure requirement is an element of a speci…c interval.
Minimum expenditure requirements in rent-seeking contests have been studied by Hillman and Samet (1987) , Yang (1993) , and Schoonbeeck and Kooreman (1997). Hillman and Samet (1987) study a perfectly discriminating contest, where the player who chooses the highest investment in rent-seeking wins with certainty. Yang (1993) studies a Dollar-Auction between two players with alternating moves. Schoonbeeck and Kooreman (1997) consider Tullock's rent-seeking game with two players and r = 1:
The assumption of a minimum expenditure requirement captures the fact that, in reality, it is often necessary to invest at least a certain minimum amount in rent-seeking activities in order to have some impact at all. For example, Yang (1993) argues that a lobby group that wants to in ‡uence a government has to articulate its aims to the public to some extend, for otherwise the government will not take the lobby group seriously. Another example is given by Schoonbeeck and Kooreman (1997), who point out that, in the Netherlands, political parties have to pay an entry fee before they can participate in an election contest for the parliament or the municipal councils.
The Unrestricted Tullock Contest With an Entry Decision
This section lays out the game introduced by Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005), which I call the Unrestricted Tullock Contest With an Entry Decision. The word "unrestricted"refers to the assumption that the strategy space is not restricted by a minimum expenditure requirement. Two risk neutral players (a and b) compete for a rent. The size of the rent is normalized to one. Let x i denote the strategy of player i. Usually, the strategy space in Tullock's rent seeking game is the set of nonnegative real numbers. Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) allow players an exit option: players simultaneously decide whether to participate or not, and in case of participation, how much to invest in rent-seeking activities. Thus, I take it that the strategy space is [0; 1) [ fN g ; with the interpretation that x i = N means that i does not participate, and x i = x 2 [0; 1) means that i participates with an investment equal to x:
The payo¤ of player i = a; b is as follows: ;
The …rst line in equation (1) says that a player who does not participate gets a payo¤ of zero. The second line describes the case where both players participate, and at least one of the investments in rent-seeking activities is strictly positive. Player a gets the share x r a = (x a r + x b r ) of the rent, and b gets the remainder; both players have to bear the cost of their investment in rent-seeking activities. I will concentrate on the case where r > 2: The third line takes care of the situation where both players participate with an investment of zero: in that case, players share the rent equally. 2 Finally, the fourth line says that if only one player participates, he gets all the rent, but has to pay the cost of his investment. 3 The game is a simultaneous move one-shot game. This is in contrast to Higgins, Shughart, and Tollison (1985) who considered a two stage rent-seeking game with endogenous participation where players announce their participation decision in a …rst stage, and those who participate decide on their investment in rent-seeking after observing the number of active competitors in a second stage. 4 
The Restricted Tullock Contest With an Entry Decision
In order to highlight the role of a minimum expenditure requirement, I now introduce the Restricted Tullock Contest With an Entry Decision. In this game the strategy space is restricted by a minimum expenditure requirement: a player has to invest at least z > 0 if he participates. Thus, the strategy space is [z; 1) [ fN g : zero. However, my results do not depend on which assumption is taken -in fact the proofs go through without modi…cation under both assumptions. 3 The formulation above di¤erentiates between nonparticipation and an investment of zero. An alternative interpretation of Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) would be to take an investment of zero as equivalent to nonparticipation. In that case, the strategy space is [0; 1) : The payo¤ of player i is
x r i +xj r x i if x i > 0, and zero if x i = 0. My comment does not depend on which interpretation is adopted -I take care to formulate all the results and proofs such that they go through under both interpretations. 4 See also Corcoran (1984) and Corcoran and Karels (1985) . 5 Under the alternative interpretation of Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) described in footnote 3, the strategy space of the restricted game is [z; 1) [ f0g :
Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005: 417) propose the following mixed strategies: players participate with probability
and, in case of participation, investments in rent-seeking equal
To see the logic behind this, consider the expected payo¤ of player a; given that he participates and b mixes between nonparticipation and investing B (DariMattiacci and Parisi 2005: 416): It is straightforward to calculate that S A (A j B ; B ) = 0: That is, participating and investing A results in an expected payo¤ of zero. Nonparticipation also results in a payo¤ of zero. Hence player a is indi¤erent between nonparticipation and participation with an investment of A :
Moreover, S A (A j B ; B ) has a local maximum at A . To see this, di¤erentiate line (4):
Inserting A ; B ; and B leads to
Thus, at A the relevant local …rst-and second-order conditions hold.
However, given r > 2; it follows from equation (7) that S A (A j B ; B ) is strictly convex in A i¤
and strictly concave i¤ A > A 0 . Thus, local …rst-and second order conditions may not be su¢ cient to characterize the global maximum. 6 In fact, this is the case in the Unrestricted Tullock Contest With an Entry Decision. Without a minimum expenditure requirement, a player could participate and invest a very small amount. In this way, his costs are negligible. He still gets the rent in case that the opponent stays out, which happens with strictly positive probability. Thus, if player a participates with a su¢ ciently small investment, he gets a strictly positive payo¤.
Remark 1
The strategies described in equations (2) and (3), where the players mix between nonparticipation on the one hand, and investing a speci…c amount in rent-seeking activities on the other, do not constitute a Nash equilibrium of the Unrestricted Tullock Contest With an Entry Decision.
Proof. Suppose player b behaves according to equations (2) and (3). If a also follows (2) and (3), he gets a payo¤ of zero. However, a 's payo¤ S A (A j B ; B ) gets arbitrarily close to 1 B > 0 by choosing a small enough A > 0: Hence participating with a su¢ ciently small investment is strictly better than staying out, or investing A .
As an example, Figure 1 plots S A (A j B ; B ) (given in equation (5) For the case r = 3; Figure 1 clearly shows that the strategies (2) and (3) are not an equilibrium of the Unrestricted Tullock Contest with an Entry Decision. However, Figure 1 also indicates that these strategies are an equilibrium if there is a su¢ ciently high minimum expenditure requirement. For example, z = 0:3 will do.
The main result of this note is that these points generalize for all r > 2. Lemma 1 de…nes the appropriate critical level of the minimum expenditure requirement, and Proposition 1 states the result formally.
Lemma 1 There exists a uniqueÂ 2 (0; r= (2 + r)) such that (2) and (3), where the players mix between nonparticipation on the one hand, and investing a speci…c amount in rent-seeking activities on the other, constitute a Nash equilibrium if and only if the minimum expenditure requirement z satis…es z 2 Â ; r 2 + r :
Proof. If z <Â; then participating and investing A = z gives player a a strictly positive payo¤ by Lemma 1, contradicting equilibrium. If z 2 hÂ ; r= (2 + r) i ; it follows from Lemma 1 that no pro…table deviation from the strategies (2) and (3) exists. A similar argument shows that player b has no incentive to deviate, either. Finally, if z > r= (2 + r) ; investing A = r= (2 + r) is not feasible.
Conclusion
Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) propose a mixed strategy equilibrium for Tullock's rent-seeking contest with an exit option and r > 2: Each player mixes between two strategies: nonparticipation, and participation with one uniquely de…ned positive level of investment in rent-seeking activities. This note shows that these strategies do not constitute an equilibrium of the game studied by DariMattiacci and Parisi (2005). However, they do constitute an equilibrium if the strategy space is restricted by a minimum expenditure requirement, and this minimum expenditure requirement lies in a speci…c interval.
